The Zuma moment : between tender-based capitalists and radical economic transformation by Desai, Ashwin
The Zuma Moment: Between Tender-based Capitalists and Radical Economic 
Transformation  
Ashwin Desai1 
Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg, Kingsway Campus, Auckland Park, 
2006, Johannesburg. 
The Jacob Zuma Presidency (2009-2017) was dogged by persistent allegations of 
corruption and the looting of State Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) by those allied to him. 
It led to allegations of state capture that placed the Gupta family at the centre of this 
project. These allegations have been highly contested, with Zuma supporters arguing 
that he has come under attack because of his support for the BRICS alliance (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, South Africa), which they hold challenges Western imperial 
interests. Alongside this are those aligned to the Gupta family, arguing that the real 
culprits of state capture, both historically and in contemporary South Africa, is White 
Monopoly Capital (WMC), through its ability to determine macro-economic policy. At 
the heart of this contest is what has come to be known as tender-based capitalists who 
sought to use access to SOE’s for the accumulation of capital. This process has been 
defended on the basis that it has the potential to lead a radical economic transformation 
(RET) that that can challenge the power of WMC. Others have held that this argument 
is a mere fig leaf for the looting of state coffers, eroding its capacity for deeper 
developmental initiatives and fostering a parasitic class. This article that focusses on 
this debate that entered the heart of the African National Congress (ANC) and 
threatened to tear it apart takes the form of a conjunctural analysis; conjuncture defined 
as an amalgam ‘of circumstances, a convergence of events, an intersection of 
contingencies and necessities, a complex, overdetermined state of affairs-usually 
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producing a crisis, leading to breaking point, driving to historic crossroads’ (Mowitt, 
2015: 125).     
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Introduction 
In the last few years, the words state capture, white monopoly capital (WMC) and radical 
economic transformation (RET) have entered the public domain in South Africa, often in 
tandem with each other. Its immediate context relates to widespread perceptions that a family 
of expatriate Indians, the Gupta family, obtained undue influence over the then President Jacob 
Zuma, and thus the state. This influence consisted of an entanglement of friendship and 
economic ties between members of the Zuma and Gupta families that have given rise to the  
epithet, Zuptas (Khumalo 2016).  
Several events reinforced the perception that the Guptas have, by association with 
former President Zuma, been able to suborn state decision-making. These ranged from the use 
of a military airbase (Waterkloof) for wedding guests, an attempt to take over South African 
Airways (SAA) routes to India and driving South Africa’s budgetary allocation for nuclear 
energy in the direction of uranium mines which they own (Mail and Guardian, December 9, 
2015). The allegations partly came to a head when South Africa’s Public Protector (a state 
ethics ombud with inquisitorial judicial powers) issued a report detailing links between 
President Zuma and the Guptas. Public Protector Thuli Madonsela’s report (2016), entitled 
State of Capture, gave credence to allegations the media, public, and opposition political parties 
had speculated all along; the Guptas wielded immense political clout and benefited 
economically through official connections to secure lucrative state contracts and private loans, 
and were themselves involved in shady mining deals involving coal, uranium, gold, platinum, 
diamonds, and iron ore (Madonsela 2016). Amongst the issues made reference to by the Public 
Protector were that Zuma improperly, and in violation of the Executive Ethics Code, allowed 
his son Duduzane and members of the Gupta family to be involved in the removal of Minister 
of Finance, Nhlanhla Nene, and appointment of  Des van Rooyen in December 2015; Deputy 
Minister of Finance Mcebisi Jonas was offered a job by the Guptas in exchange for extending 
favours to their family business;2 the Guptas were allegedly involved in the awarding of large 
contracts from Eskom, the state-owned electricity utility;3 Zuma improperly used his position, 
or information entrusted to him, to give preferential treatment to businesses owned by the 
Guptas and his son Duduzane Zuma in the awarding of state contracts, business financing, and 
trading licences; Government advertising was deliberately channelled to the Guptas’ 
newspaper, New Age, and television channel ANN7; and that Zuma may have been in breach 
of his legal duties in failing to investigate these matters or act against wrongdoings. 
The report called for a judicial commission into the allegations, one that was 
‘adequately resourced’ and presided over by a judge chosen by the Chief Justice of South 
Africa. This recommendation suggested that the Public Protector had no faith in the partiality 
of a commission chosen by the President. The Public Protector ordered that the commission 
report back within 180 days after its appointment.  
In December 2016, Zuma mounted a legal challenge against the remedial action 
recommended by the report, arguing that it was his constitutional prerogative to appoint the 
leader of the commission and not that of the chief justice. Bantu Holomisa, leader of the United 
Democratic Movement (UDM) party, tweeted sarcastically: ‘the main suspect Zuma goes to 
court to demand that he personally appoints a Commission to investigate himself. Joke!’ 
                                                            
2 Jonas told the Protector that he had been offered 600m South African rands (around $44m as calculated 
in November 2016) by Ajay Gupta to agree to be appointed finance minister and use his position to 
replace some of the executives in the National Treasury who were a ‘stumbling block’ to the Gupta 
family’s business ambitions. Jonas declined the offer. Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene was replaced by 
Van Rooyen, then a little known backbencher. The report stated that Van Rooyen had spent a 
considerable amount of time with the Guptas, including their Saxonwold, Johannesburg residence many 
times, and on the day before he was announced as Minister. 
3 Between 2 August 2015 and 22 March 2016, Eskom CEO Brain Molefe called Ajay Gupta 44 times 
while Ajay called Molefe 14 times. Eskom’s awarding of a coal contract to Tegeta was irregular and 
the Eskom board was improperly appointed. Molefe initially tried to laugh off the suggestions, stating 
that he visited a shebeen in the area. However, public pressure forced him to resign in December 2016. 
In true Zuma-fashion, he was back in the limelight when the ANC appointed him as MP in February 
2017. Opposition parties feared that he would be put into the National Treasury to strengthen the Gupta-
Zuma control of the fiscus. 
 
(@BantuHolomisa, December 3, 2016). Under pressure before the ANC’s December 2017 
elective conference, Zuma back-tracked and agreed to the Chief Justice being allowed to 
appoint the leader of the Commission. The Commission, which is scheduled began its work in 
the second half of  2018 is  headed by Deputy Chief Justice Ray Zondo.    
 There is a growing international literature on corruption, and specifically its 
relationship to state capture, inequality and the rise of populism. According to Philip (2001), a 
case of corruption occurs when ‘a public official (A), acting for personal gain, violates the 
norms of public office and harms the interests of the public (B) to benefit a third party (C) who 
rewards A for access to goods or services which C would not otherwise obtain.’ This article is 
specifically concerned with one of the most direct and serious consequences of corruption, 
namely state capture. The World Bank (2000) first coined this term to refer to the situation in 
those countries that were part of the former Soviet Republic, where in the transition from 
communism, small groups of people used the state to enrich themselves. They came to be 
known as ‘oligarchs’. In Latin America, the focus was on the role of drug lords in corrupting 
the state (Crabtree and Durand 2017, 1). Philip (2001) defines state capture as ‘the domination 
of state institutions by individuals or groups in pursuit of their private interests.’ Lugon-Moulin 
(2017) states that state capture occurs when business or ruling elites ‘manipulate policy 
formation and influence the emerging rules of the game (including laws and economic 
regulations) to their own advantage.’ According to Edwards (2017), private individuals 
manipulate the law and government bureaucracy in instances of state capture, which may not 
necessarily be illegal, but is aimed at influencing state policies and laws in their favour. Lugon-
Moulin (2017) alerts us to the fact that in examining state capture, we should focus on the 
‘types of institutions subject to capture (Legislative, Executive, Judiciary, regulatory agencies, 
public works ministries) and the types of actors actively seeking to capture (large private firms, 
political leaders, high ranking officials, interest groups).’ 
Against this background, it is our contention that what distinguishes state capture from 
ordinary corruption is the capacity of private interests to intrude in state affairs to the point of 
directly determining state policy. 
This is not the stuff of lobbying or bribing officials to get contracts for work that is both 
necessary and properly decided upon. The private actor is enabled to directly determine policy 
such that “captured” members of the executive champion projects and steer budgetary 
allocations towards these private actors. The state does not simply get ripped off, it is 
controlled. 
Bhorat et al. (2017) make the allegation this way. The Gupta-Zuma alliance, comprising 
a relatively small network of companies and individuals, holds a ‘symbiotic relationship 
between the constitutional and shadow state together …’ (Bhorat et al. 2017, 61). Performed 
efficiently, the capture of a state occurs quite openly through the exercise of legal and 
administrative decision-making. The decision has, however, already been made in the shadows. 
Such a move is responsive solely to private financial interests and it is the executive’s task to 
either dress it up as policy or else ward off any legal challenges to it.       
The epitome of state capture was the supposed Gupta-inspired replacement of previous 
Finance Minister, Nhlanhla Nene, on the apparent grounds that he refused, among other things, 
to authorise a budget for nuclear power expansion in South Africa. If Nene did not baulk, the 
way lay open for Treasury to commit to spending several billion rand, from which the Gupta 
family could greatly profit. Moreover, Zuma replaced Nene with Gupta-aligned Des van 
Rooyen, whose role it allegedly was to advance the businessmen’s interests once his 
predecessor was out the way.  
Madonsela’s report details that, upon briefly assuming the role of Finance Minister, van 
Rooyen arrived at the National Treasury with two Gupta associates as “advisors”. The advisors 
began asking for information relevant to tenders that Gupta-connected companies could get. 
The strong implication is that the Gupta’s had succeeded in acquiring direct access to state 
affairs at the highest level (Public Protector 2016). 
As these allegations unfolded, those defending the Zuptas raised the banner of RET. At 
its most coherent and audacious, the idea behind (RET) is that the spending of SOEs in 
particular must handsomely benefit black entrepreneurs, which will be a catalyst to defeat the 
dominance of WMC and advance the black nationalist cause. To the extent that existing 
procurement policies or budgetary allocations hinder the creation of black industrialists and 
financiers, these policies must either be abandoned or their violation ignored.   
Radical economic transformation? 
The firing of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and his Deputy Mcebisi Jonas at the end of 
March 2017 was seen as a decisive advance for those allied to the Gupta faction and their 
rhetoric of taking on WMC. The replacement Minister, Malusi Gigaba and his Deputy Sifiso 
Buthelezi, were both seen as Zuma loyalists. Gigaba moreover, was perceived to be beholden 
to the Guptas. This advanced Zuma’s control of the National Treasury, long seen as a stumbling 
block for embarking on mega-projects involving tenderpreneurs allied to Zuma. These 
developments gave real impetus to the idea that the Zuptas had captured the state, remembering 
the working definition offered earlier of exerting control upstream in determining policy and 
budgetary allocations. 
Contrary to this reading, Chris Malikane, University of the Witwatersrand (WITS) 
academic, argues that the present conjuncture offers an opportunity for a radical breakthrough. 
He argues that post-1994, WMC ruled the roost but this dominance is coming to an end. He 
argues that ‘the removal of the Finance Minister [Pravin Gordhan] without the approval of 
white monopoly capital has signalled the end of the phase of unfettered white monopoly 
capitalist domination, at least within the state and the ruling party’ (Sunday Times, April 16, 
2017). For Malikane, the unfolding events see on the one side “white monopoly capital” and 
“credit-based black capitalists” (beneficiaries of BEE hand-outs from white monopoly capital, 
i.e., Cyril Ramaphosa), and on the other, those black capitalists who have pioneered an 
independent path from WMC (the Gupta’s one would presume), accumulating capital through 
state tenders. Malikane sees this grouping as important to prosecuting RET. As he puts it: ‘In 
so far as the tender-based capitalist-class has begun its war against the dominant white 
monopoly capitalist class (and its black allies), it has to be encouraged’ (Sunday Times, April 
16, 2017).   
Malikane’s intervention led to a strident response from ideologues of the SACP, Jeremy 
Cronin, Alex Mashilo and Malesela Maleka, who argued that  
Monopoly capitalists, credit-based capitalists, tender-based capitalists – white, 
black and brown – it’s the whole bunch of them that we need to deal with. But, 
in the immediate present, the most problematic danger to any progressive 
advance comes precisely from the reckless parasitic, Gupta and Gupta-like 
behaviour of Malikane’s “tender-based” bourgeoisie and its political 
accomplices. The working class has a critical role to play in fighting both 
monopoly capital and Gupterisation. We cannot do the former without dealing 
with the latter. Radical economic transformation is simply impossible with a 
corporately captured state and an ANC-led movement factionalised by 
moneyed, patronage networks (Cronin et al. 2017). 
Times change and factions of capital, who are the immediate enemy, also change. In 
2013, Cronin told us that ‘we vastly overestimated the patriotic credentials of South African 
monopoly capitalism (and its soon to emerge narrow BEE) hangers on.’ For Cronin, so 
seductive was monopoly capitalism that when they asked that ‘all doors and windows to attract 
inward investment flows’ be opened, it was hastily complied with and the outcome was ‘the 
exact opposite…Between 20% and 25% of GDP has been div-vested out of the country since 
1994’ (Cronin 2013, 4).  
In 2013, it was monopoly capitalism and BEE beneficiaries that stood in the way of ‘a 
second, radical phase of our democratic transition’ (Cronin 2013, 8). With Zuma at the helm 
and SACP leaders holding Cabinet positions, Cronin surmised that the second phase was on its 
way. Seven years later, we are told that it is the tender-based capitalists that need to be first 
sorted out before any radical transformation can be prosecuted.  
And so in 2017, the SACP, while criticising what they perceive as the neo-liberal 
orientation of the Gordhan’s and Jonas’s, argued that their struggle against the Guptas and their 
allies needs to be joined. This is another variation of the SACP’s two-stage struggle; first deal 
with the Guptas and the parasitic tender-based bourgeoisie and then go after monopoly capital. 
Malikane’s thesis does not engage with the argument that given the unbundling of 
WMC, the growth of black capital and the entry of foreign capital into South Africa, the nature 
of monopoly capital is changing in South Africa. This is a position taken by Roger Southall, 
who points out that,  
by 1990, just three conglomerates –Anglo-American, Sanlam and Old Mutual 
controlled a whopping 75% of the total capitalisation of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) but by 2016, this had decreased significantly, with Anglo-
American controlling only 15%, foreign ownership rising to 39% and ‘black 
direct ownership (mainly through BEE schemes) to 10% (Southall 2017).  
Ashman et al. disagree with this analysis. They argue that, while at one level there has 
been a decrease in the share of the top five conglomerates, one of the central reasons is 
corporate restructuring and  
…the increased internationalization of the largest South African corporations. 
Four of the companies that were in the top five (in terms of market capitalization 
on the JSE) have moved their primary listings abroad, or else decided to list 
jointly in South Africa and elsewhere (2017, 82).  
As to foreign interest in the JSE, it  
…has increased from 1.9 percent in 1991 to 10.1 percent in 2002 and to 30 
percent in 2012 (having peaked at 33 percent in 2009). There have certainly 
been some acquisitions of local companies by foreign firms, but most of the 
change in foreign ownership is the result of the change in the structure of South 
African firms now listed overseas. Increased speculative short-term foreign-
portfolio investment inflows also contributed to the growing levels of foreign 
institutional ownership. As a result, South African listed corporations are 
subject to both the volatility associated with shifting global portfolio capital 
flows and the demands for greater payouts to shareholders (Ashman et al. 2017, 
83).   
The then Minister of Police in Zuma’s cabinet and former President of the ANC Youth 
League, Fikile Mbalula argues, contra Southall, that the changing ownership notwithstanding, 
WMC is the main impediment to fundamental change in South Africa: 
Of the R1-trillion in cash hoarded by corporates at white-owned banks, none of 
that cash is black-owned. Of the R5.8-trillion private property (excludes 
agrarian and commercial land) value in South Africa, blacks own township or 
RDP style properties. Take the private investment funds industry whose 
customer base is largely white; this industry has a cash value of R4.5-trillion. 
White monopoly capital’s strategy is to cause blacks to de-focus, break apart 
and fight over crumbs… The ANC supports foreign direct investment; this is 
good, but that foreigners own half of the JSE illustrates the risk the majority 
rule is under. We are living at the mercy of external forces that are reshaping 
our politics through capital accumulation because the majority of this country 
has no means to own this very half. No other industrialised country has more 
than 40% of its stock market owned by foreigners but South Africa (Daily 
Maverick, May 6, 2017).4 
  What Mbalula does not account for is that the ANC government has done little to dent 
the power of monopolies and, given its continued orientation to create a suitable investment 
climate for capital, what home-grown social forces can challenge the power of WMC? Does 
he think that tender-based capitalists can do this?  
                                                            
4 One should be reminded that Mbalula was involved in what could be argued was a curtain-raiser to 
the Gupta’s state capture. This centred around businessman Brett Kebble, who despite being white, tried 
to take on old white capital at the turn of the new millennium. Kebble targeted the ANC Youth League 
(ANCYL) and focused his attempts at wealth accumulation by dubious means. The Youth League had 
a reputation for periodically questioning ANC policy and spearheading generational change within the 
party, thus making individuals ideal targets for a business person with a long view on state capture to 
invest in. Kebble bought and ended up running iconic mining companies, Western Areas, JCI 
and Randgold & Exploration into the ground, while over R2 billion worth of assets somehow dissipated. 
As Barry Sergeant lays bare in his book The Kebble Collusion (2012), Kebble 
…focused on forging ties with various individuals in politics, law enforcement and the 
intelligence services. He also focused on forging ties with various individuals in 
politics, law enforcement and the intelligence services. He also focused, in particular, 
on developing close ties with the leadership of the ANC Youth League, financing a 
number of its functions, and co-opting the organisation into various “black 
empowerment” deals (2012, 245).    
Fikile Mbalula admitted that Kebble’s relationship with the youth league and its leaders was 
symbiotic: ‘He wanted political capital out of that relationship to advance his business interests and the 
youth league wanted to advance its business interests’ (Rossouw 2011).  
 
While to his credit Malikane characterises the tender-based capitalists as ‘extremely 
unreliable’, he does not explain how a parasitic capitalist class can be a key player in RET. It 
would appear that Malikane does not appreciate the effect that tenders as a way of accumulating 
capital has on the ability of the state to discharge its duties. As Chipkin (Sunday Times, August 
6, 2017) argues, the problem with the Zuma government’s model of transformation is that it 
focuses on the state not the economy.  
The value of goods and services resulting from the outsourcing of core government 
functions stands around R500 billion per annum. ‘Essentially’, he writes, ‘the government has 
become a massive, tender-generating machine.’ While government procurement that is 
committed to empower black businesses may be noble, Chipkin believes that this strategy 
backfires, because ‘the politicisation of procurement in the name of radical economic 
transformation frequently brings it into conflict with service-delivery mandates…This is 
especially devastating for working families and for the poor, who are more dependent on 
government services than the middle classes and the rich (Sunday Times, August 6, 2017).    
Mike Morris makes a similar point, holding that 
The mode of accumulation of this predatory bourgeoisie (or elite if that term is 
preferable) is integrally dependant on illegitimately siphoning off financial 
resources from various levels and institutions of the South African state in the 
form of…dodgy deals which result in no productive return for the economy…It 
makes little difference whether they are feeding off the state, SOE’s, or private 
enterprises. Fundamentally it is a predatory form of accumulation, which yields 
no independent economic goods or services, it ultimately impoverishes the 
ordinary citizens of the country by robbing them of funds intended for delivery 
of a wide range of services. This class is predatory as well as parasitic upon the 
state (Daily Maverick, August 15, 2017).  
Morris goes on to advance the centrality of monopoly capital, making the case that it  
…is much better placed to play an important role in, although not lead, an 
inclusive alliance to build a broad democratic coalition for the restructuring of 
South Africa’s economic and social landscape. It appears to be finally stung into 
finding its voice… Big business has the economic resources and capacity to 
support a redistribution project to tackle inequality, but only if economic growth 
is assured to generate the resources to pay for redistribution. It requires a proper 
functioning state and institutional framework committed to due process and 
procedure, and hence will support rooting out those who have perverted state 
functions. Business needs the threat of further downgrades to disappear from 
the global landscape, and so will support a new growth path which guarantees 
its own profitable survival. It needs political stability guaranteed by a 
functioning democracy and stable government, for without it there can be no 
interest in further investment to impact on unemployment (Daily Maverick, 
August 15, 2017).    
What Morris fails to confront is that during the Mandela and Mbeki years, there was 
modest economic growth. This did not result in a windfall of jobs, rather what we had was 
escalating unemployment.   
Patrick Bond, responding to Morris’ call for the importance of monopoly capital in re-
building the country, reminds that Price Waterhouse Coopers 
regularly names the Sandton elite [monopoly capital - addition author] as the 
world’s most prone to corruption - especially procurement fraud, money-
laundering, asset misappropriation and bribery-and 80% of our corporate 
managers “do crime” (Mail & Guardian, October 6-12, 2017).       
With Mandela in power, monopoly capital had a powerful lobby in developing 
government policy (Waldmeir 1997, 255-6). Mandela was happy that he had them on board in 
what the ANC saw as a hostile economic climate. Under Mbeki, these economic “realities” 
continued but with an ideological orientation to nurture a black bourgeoisie (MacDonald 2004, 
648).  
This aspirant African bourgeoisie influence in the ANC grew, with ANC big-wig Pallo 
Jordan commenting: ‘Whereas in the past there were no captains of industry in the leading 
organs of the ANC; today an NEC [National Executive Committee] member heads one of the 
largest conglomerates trading on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (quoted in MacDonald 
2004, 649). ‘One estimate calculated that the ANC’s national executive committee, elected in 
2007, included twenty-eight people with interests in sixty-nine companies worth billions of 
rands’ (Russell 2011, 178). The financial clout of the ANC’s investment arm Chancellor House 
grew, as more and more spaces were created for black millionaires in the NEC.     
Alongside this, the BEE drive has produced intersecting interests. This was illustrated 
most profoundly with the August 16, 2012 Marikana massacre, which saw the coming together 
of old mining capital, new black interests in the form of Cyril Ramaphosa and the exercise of 
state power that brought back memories of the 1922 strike (Saul and Bond 2014).  
Of relevance here is the interplay between state agencies, BEE landlords and company 
management in the run up to the shooting. Emails came to light, authored by ANC 
heavyweight, billionaire beneficiary of early BEE deals and non-executive director and 
minority shareholder of Lonmin, Cyril Ramaphosa revealed the link between state power, BEE 
interests and old white capital (Mail and Guardian, June 19, 2015). On 16 August 2012, 
Lonmin’s association with Ramaphosa certainly came in handy in dealing with the strikers. 
Initially, the Minister responsible for mines, Susan Shabangu, characterised the upheaval at 
Lonmin as primarily a labour dispute, albeit with elements of criminality on its fringes. The 
then Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa took a similarly non-criminal approach to events. The 
people on the hill (koppie) were thus, in the estimation of two central ministers of state, 
principally a collective of disgruntled workers. After Ramaphosa’s intervention, Shabangu 
characterised them as criminals and prevailed upon Mthethwa to adopt a similarly ‘pointed’ 
view. These policy shifts, 24 hours later, resulted in the police arming and conducting 
themselves in a manner strikingly aligned with Lonmin’s desires. 
As Lonmin starkly shows, there is a cross-over of BEE, old white capital and those 
holding the reins of political power.  
Another example is the brazen way in which shares at Goldfields were handed out to 
ANC big-wigs like present parliamentary speaker, Baleka Mbete. Tokyo Sexwale, once 
Premier of Gauteng and one of the early beneficiaries of BEE hand-outs, bemoaned the results 
of BEE:  
Traditionally white capital used to own more than 99.95% of this 
economy…We could have come in and demanded 70 percent of businesses in 
line with demographics. We didn’t do that. It is 25 percent for mining, about 10 
percent in banking…What does that mean? In mining 75 percent is still in white 
hands (quoted in Russell 2011, 178). 
In the face of this, those grouped around the Zuptas argued that they were seeking to 
tip the balance away from monopoly capital and Mbeki’s BEE beneficiaries in favour of tender-
based capitalists as a way to challenge WMC. BEE was supposed to, in the words of Mbeki, 
be the lynchpin of creating and strengthening a black capitalist class (Saul and Bond 2014, 
223). Much was expected of this black bourgeoisie which, according to Pallo Jordan, was 
committed to ‘job creation, the fostering of skills development, the empowerment of women, 
the strengthening of the popular organs of civil society, and active involvement in the fight to 
end poverty’ (quoted in MacDonald 2004, 649). By the time of the Zuma presidency, it was 
clear that BEE had become the preserve of a few, that there were few genuine businesses 
created, and many of the deals were mired in debt. By 2014, the ANC’s head of elections and 
once Premier of Limpopo Ngoako Ramatlhodi, held that the ANC was ‘managing a white-man 
economy on behalf of white men who ran the economy under apartheid’ (quoted in Saul and 
Bond 2014, 223). If the ideological and political reasons for conglomerate support for BEE 
were to ensure that racial antagonism towards capital and capitalism was progressively 
reduced, this project was wearing thin. In this environment, those who sought to access state 
tenders launched an attack on what they characterised as the continuing dominance of WMC.  
Andile Mngxitama, founder member of the Black First Land First movement (BLF) 
argued that the fundamental contradiction in South Africa is that ‘white monopoly capitalism 
renders the black majority powerless.’ Zuma’s association with the Guptas was a deliberate 
‘strategy (on his part) to look more towards the East’ since the “colonial state” that the ANC 
inherited could not be transformed because the constitution has entrenched white power. Zuma 
is thus seeking to empower black people through ‘parallel processes’, which has angered white 
capital because the Guptas have secured lucrative mega projects, thus beating them at their own 
game (Mngxitama 2016).  
Mngxitama argued that there was a parallel between the Zuptas and the era of white 
minority rule in South Africa when white capital ‘was created with the direct support of the 
state.’ Yet, when a political settlement was being negotiated in South Africa, white monopoly 
capital was not asked to ‘account for their wealth, created from the super-exploitation and 
dispossession of blacks.’ The attack on the Guptas was a ‘proxy war … to distract the angry 
youth from the real enemy’, white capital, ‘which continues with business as usual.’ 
Mngxitama further argued that calls for the Guptas to leave South Africa was  
dangerous as it involves the demagogic mobilisation of anti-Indian stereotypes 
and feeds into xenophobic tropes to organise the most backward sentiments in 
society and deflect attention from the real source of the South African problem, 
which is white capital created from colonialism and apartheid (Mngxitama 
2016).  
The attacks on Zuma have also seen to be as a result of his purported anti-Western 
imperialist stance, a point made by convicted bank robber and founder of the Patriotic Alliance 
Gayton McKenzie:  
Especially for Africa, Brics represents the first major opportunity in centuries 
to break the grip of colonialism and post-colonialism for the continent. Jacob 
Zuma understands that, and the West is none too happy about it either…it’s 
obvious he understands what’s at stake. The world and its economy at a cross-
roads and for the first time an alternative is becoming available that could 
challenge centuries of oppression (McKenzie 2017: 160). 
Zuma himself fed into this narrative, revealing in August 2017 that he ‘was poisoned 
just because South Africa joined Brics’ under his guidance (quoted in McKenzie 2017: 162).    
F(r)actions of capital  
For a time, the characterisation of capital as White or simply monopoly capital grabbed the 
headlines. Those defending the tender-based capitalists insisted on racial characterisation, on 
the basis that it was based on facts. Opponents held that this was a diversion for the tender-
based capitalists while they looted the state. Indeed, evidence shows that London-based, Gupta-
hired public relations firm, Bell Pottinger, manipulated the term WMC.5 As it turns out, the 
naming of capital became a proxy war between the two erstwhile candidates for President of 
the ANC (Daily Maverick, July 6, 2017). On one side were Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and 
her allies, including President Zuma, who led the charge against WMC and are heavily 
implicated with those benefitting from SOE tenders. On the other was Cyril Ramaphosa’s 
faction, who in the build-up, argued that the word “white” should be dropped and instead 
monopoly capital should be engaged and contested with.  
Having said that, one can see how Malikane’s thesis of a bridgehead to radical 
economic transformation that involves tender-based capitalists partnering with the black 
working class to end racial oppression and exploitation resonates with Africanists like the BLF. 
It also holds possibilities for sections of the Left who see post-1994 as the dominance of WMC 
and those at the heart of Treasury as its willing agents.  
However Malikane and allies on the Left who see it as a vanguard against WMC do not 
explicate the way in which tender-based capitalists look beyond using the state simply as a way 
to accumulate capital. It is not in the business of using this capital to invest in ways that would 
create jobs, develop national industry and expand the internal market. Tender-based capitalists 
act erringly, like Fanon’s warning about the national bourgeoisie that perform like a member 
                                                            
5 Evidence emerged that Bell Pottinger masterminded a social media campaign to divert attention from 
the Guptas’ involvement in state capture by emphasising the role of white monopoly capital in the South 
African economy. They came up with such slogans as #endeconomicapartheid, while besmirching 
journalists, politicians, and government officials who exposed Gupta-linked corruption. Bell Pottinger 
also drafted some of the inflammatory speeches made by the ANC Youth League. The DA submitted a 
formal complaint with the UK-based public relations industry body that Bell Pottinger, by acting 
unethically, had manipulated public opinion to create racial divisions in South Africa. In July 2017, 
days before it was due to appear before the Public Relations Communications Association and the 
Chartered Institute of Public Relations, Bell Pottinger issued a public apology to South Africans for the 
racial tensions it had fomented in the country and dismissed the lead partner involved (Thamm 2017). 
It is of more than passing interest that one of Bell Pottinger’s clients is none other than Richemont, 
owned by Johann Rupert. Richemont cancelled its account with Bell Pottinger once association with 
the Guptas became public.  
 
of a gang ‘who after every hold-up hides their swag from other accomplices’ (2001, 139). This 
is no ‘true bourgeoisie’ according to Fanon but only a sort of little greedy caste, avid and 
voracious’ (2001, 141).      
Crucially, revelations around the Guptas have shown the cross-over when it comes to 
corruption, with representatives of WMC like ‘spin-doctors Bell-Pottinger, accountants KPMG 
and consultants McKinsey’ aiding and abetting local black capital (Bond in Mail & Guardian, 
October 6-12, 2017). 
Ramaphosa: A new dawn?  
The rhetoric of Capital Wars reached deep into the heart of the ANC, benchmarked by the two 
Presidential candidates at its December 2017 elective conference. On Valentine’s Day 2018, 
just before midnight, the Zuma era closed with his late-night resignation on national TV. 
Ramaphosa’s victory put the Guptas on the run and rehabilitated those like Gordhan and Nene 
purged under Zuma’s leadership, both appointed as cabinet ministers. But the highest decision-
making body of the ANC, the National Executive Committee (NEC), still includes a fair 
amount of Zuma supporters and Ramaphosa has had to accommodate some of them in his 
cabinet.  
As for the Zuma moment, as veteran investigative journalist Jacques Pauw (2017) 
shows in his book The President’s Keepers; Those Keeping Zuma in Power and Out of Prison, 
the cliché of standing on a precipice does not describe the perils of recent past. Already shoved 
off the cliff, the party was dangling on the withered roots of battered constitutional institutions. 
It was only through the tightening grip of the press who the ANC so despised, the judges it 
derided and liberal Non-Governmental Organisations it accused of being CIA, that South 
Africa was saved from the failed state rocks below.  
What does it say about the character of the ANC that it could keep Zuma for so long? 
In some respects, the answer partly flows from the hold that a leader playing the victim, playing 
up race and insinuating imperialist plots has over the national psyche. Because of our history, 
these tropes have an enduring material basis. Cloaking personal and chauvinist interests in 
high-sounding principle is a national sport in South Africa. It is hard to distinguish between 
those who fail because they are daft and those unfairly pulled down, those who are in need and 
those who envy the stuff of others, and those who agitate for necessary change or reckless ruin.  
And so it came to be touted that because Zuma positioned himself as part of an anti-
imperialist bloc, the grouping of BRICS, he was being targeted by the West and white 
monopoly capital (WMC). BRICS so anguished the West apparently, that it was claimed   
Zuma had been poisoned and only survived through the intervention of Russian doctors. A 
colossal nuclear deal with Russia was hastily agreed, cancelled on procedural grounds and then 
desperately resurrected, allegedly through the icy menace posed by roubles already spent.  
 
Stories abounded of Russian secret agents crossing the border to implore Zuma to make 
good on the deal, alleging that this was the President and his crew’s kiloton pay-off. Indeed, 
just before his ousting, Zuma pleaded to remain in office until after the BRICS Johannesburg 
summit in July 2018, which only added fuel to the rumour reactor. This tale is told with aplomb 
in a book written by Zuma ally Gayton McKenzie, entitled Kill Zuma: By Any Means 
Necessary. Pauw and McKenzie might be read in tandem, if only to show how South Africans 
live in parallel analytical universes. In the pages of McKenzie’s book, Zuma emerges as South 
Africa’s anti-imperialist hero and Cyril Ramaphosa as the willing dupe of white monopoly 
capital (WMC). 
The mission to eradicate inequality also served as a rationale for some black middle-
class business people in the Zuma years to do whatever it took to win tenders previously 
awarded to whites. In this reading, tender-based capitalists became a vanguard in the struggle 
against the old enemy, WMC. The problem for those recommending this position was that the 
archetypal tender-based capitalists were the Gupta brothers, hardly some D-Day landing party 
in an onslaught against the financial barons of the West. Indeed, close analysis of a tranche of 
leaked emails from the heart of their business empire, #GuptaLeaks, revealed them to be very 
much in league with the supposed custodians of WMC, including the US-based consultancy 
firm, McKinsey and Co, and the German IT firm, SAP.  
On home turf, when criticism of Duduzane, Zuma’s son’s connection to the Gupta 
family were first made – incidentally, Duduzane became a dollar billionaire by the age of 34 - 
Zuma sought refuge in liberation tropes. Again, he was being targeted for continuing the next 
stage of the struggle: RET. This suddenly became policy. Land would be taken from whites 
without compensation. Tertiary education would be free. Significant portions of the population 
lapped up this radical beer. 
One truth is intuited in the criticism of Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa’s new President. 
He is not a Struggle man as the model has come to be viewed. Ramaphosa did not go into exile 
or join the liberation armies. Neither was he incarcerated on Robben Island. He only joined the 
ANC in the late 1980s, spending his time building a trade union inside the country. He then 
entered business, becoming a billionaire as one of the preferred black partners of white 
companies seeking to establish their transformation credentials. For over a decade, he 
languished in the luxury of game farms, private jets and buffets that could feed a village. 
Not being the quintessential struggle man means Ramaphosa can contemplate things 
that previous leaders, imprisoned in their biographies, could not. Ramaphosa’s instincts place 
more trust in the market. Leftist rhetoric sits uneasily and with a little boredom on his well-
cadenced tongue. If it were not for the need to catch votes from constituencies with a taste for 
melodramatic, messianic promises, one gets the sense he would abandon talk of advancing the 
national democratic revolution and other “liberation speak” hangovers altogether. He will 
probably only raise an occasional bleat about corporate corruption and leveraging political 
connections to accumulate wealth. Not being the struggle man also means he has no shield 
against being quickly cast as a Quisling.  
Ramaphosa is famed as a negotiator not a ruthless underground operative. He does not 
draw on these memes of struggle for legitimacy. Indeed, he is the first post-apartheid leader to 
be brought to power in reaction to disaffection with this particular liberation legacy. For 
twenty-four years, their legacy is one of unaccountable kleptocrats, conspicuously unequal, 
intellectually and morally, to the task of governing a modern state, railing against whites and 
capitalism in public, but more than happy to be kept by the same, as Pauw shows, in private. 
In Ramaphosa, the ANC may well have avoided the traditional curse of liberation movements: 
removal from power a quarter of a century after winning freedom by a people jaded by 
underperformance. In a sense, the ANC has produced its very own opposition leader and then 
ingested the Morgan Tsvangirai or Frederick Chiluba who would otherwise have swept them 
from power. While Zuma might have left office pleading and whimpering for a few months 
more, the shadows of his tenure loom. The ANC’s agreement on land expropriation from 
whites without compensation is one of them. While it is still early days, Ramaphosa cannily 
seeks to pose this fairly popular demand in forward looking, commercial terms. He has taken 
this controversial initiative adopted in the dying days of Zuma’s presidency, one expressed in 
a tone of racial requital, and recast it as an economic necessity to increase agricultural yield for 
the economy as a whole.  
In the Introduction to his book, Pauw mentions the theft of his computer as the book 
was nearing completion and his fear that state security agencies were behind it. His wife 
convinced him though to calm down. Why? Because the hole in the window was too small for 
an adult to crawl through. It must have been a child on one of the farms around Riebeek-Kasteel 
in the Western Cape living in poverty. Inequality with stark racial optics is an abiding fact in 
South African society. Inequality within the black community is less visible but just as 
pronounced. It is plainly immoral for there to be desperate children in the midst of such 
splendour. Even from the point of view of enlightened self-interest, South Africa’s elites must 
support redistributive measures. If youth unemployment, hovering at 50%, is not dealt with in 
a generation, it could provide succour to future rogues grasping their way up the political pole. 
When the British based public relations firm Bell Pottinger cynically used the term ‘white 
monopoly capital’ as an epithet to shield the Guptas, it didn’t disqualify the criticism. Whites 
and blacks. Rich and poor. Educated and uneducated still typically live in different lands and 
there is not enough social mobility to go around to placate those who want to better their lot 
constitutionally. If there is a bright side to the suborning of the South African state to assorted 
crooks and conmen under Zuma, it is this: the “Struggle” as authenticator of persons and ideas 
is diminishing. Whatever its past glories, this struggle, within 20 years, produced Zuma and 
his ANC keepers. They so easily abused their credentials that it has put the struggle’s centrality 
in our future politics in question. It is tempting to see the failings of Zuma and his cronies as 
the general failings of human nature. But it is far worse. Something is peculiarly rotten about 
liberation movements and the literal pillage to which their leaders feel entitled after democracy 
arrives. The repertoire of denial by Zuma’s keepers in South Africa was gallingly surreal and 
typically sycophantic towards the Big Man. Swimming pools became fire-fighting reservoirs. 
Women ministers rounded upon Zuma’s rape-accuser in the most patriarchal terms. For three-
quarters of Zuma’s time in office, almost every ANC cadre bowed and scraped to obviously 
corrupt Presidential appointees in every state institution with nary a leak to the press, court 
challenge or resignation. Ramaphosa included.  
The criminal enterprise grouped behind the Zuptas that was able to use the language of 
anti-imperialism and the whiteness of monopoly capital to loot the state has been pushed back. 
But, does the future look better for those many kids in Riebeek- Kasteel under a corrupt populist 
or a president working within the rule of law and the free-market but which cannot or will not 
put a brake on private sector crime and which does not aggressively propose a redistribution 
programme? What the Zuma moment has taught us is that for all the talk of reconciliation and 
non-racialism and “keeping the fundamentals of the economy intact”, there is a racial 
nationalism that burns. As Fanon warns, it is sparked by the national middle class, envelops 
the working class and the unemployed and hurries from nationalism ‘to ultra-nationalism, to 
chauvinism and finally to racism…foreigners are called on to leave, their shops are burned, 
their stalls are wrecked’ (Fanon 2001, 128).  
If the Ramaphosa government cannot provide those kids with relief, and quick, we’ll 
be having this discussion when the pendulum swings again and they get to select and keep a 
president of their own. 
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